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ABSTRACT 
Sociological insights from other societies can enlarge our understanding of events and organizations in 
our own society. This becomes even more important as we are dealing with immigrants from cultural 
backgrounds which are vastly different than ours, particularly from Muslim societies. Some Western 
and Islamic voices have come to advocate the narrative of a “clash of civilizations”, of a war on 
terrorism and jihad respectively. In such polarizing frameworks, behavior of minorities, which 
previously went unnoticed or was not perceived as a threat to the wider society, suddenly emerges in 
form of indexical orders which link micro-contextual phenomena to the macro-sociological 
antagonistic narrative, effectively ascribing the other a hostile attitude. 
To overcome some false dichotomies, this paper first looks at the West European concept of nested 
hierarchies of normative systems and then sketches historically, legally and ethnographically the 
overlapping hierarchy of the polycentric and multinormative society of Jordan as an alternative 
interpretation framework of the behavior of Muslims in Germany. 
Keywords: polycentric multinormativity, intercultural conflict, indexical orders, Ottoman 
history, Jordan, Germany, immigrants, parallel societies 
INTRODUCTION 
What could an ethnographic study of a Middle Eastern society possibly contribute to a subject like 
“Europe in Discourse”? That is a very fair question to ask and it is not surprising that somebody doing 
ethnographic research in Jordan should delete the call for papers for the above-mentioned conference 
from his in-box right away, deeming his own research utterly irrelevant for the conference theme. This 
paper owes its existence to two “encounters” of sorts; two ideas which combined led to the realization 
that even though it might seem counterintuitive at first there are indeed very important lessons to be 
extracted from ethnographic data gathered in the Middle East. 
The first was a statement from Howard S. Becker's book What about Mozart? What about Murder? 
Reasoning from Cases (2014). In the chapter “What's Happening Elsewhere: Reasoning from a Case to 
the World” Becker suggests that “[w]hen sociologists look at other countries, they hope to see 
something different from what they see at home. But they also want to use what they see elsewhere to 
enlarge their understanding of events and organizations at home” (Becker, 2014, Chapter 2, paragraph 
2). 
Becker’s hint at the value of insights about other countries for understanding our own society prepared 
the second encounter, which took the shape of a German TV report with the title Ein Staat - zwei 
Welten? Einwanderer in Deutschland (Knobel-Ulrich, 2015), which translates into “One State - Two 
Worlds? Immigrants in Germany”, tackling the issue of parallel societies. The word 
Parallelgesellschaft, i.e. the German word for parallel societies, was originally introduced by the 
sociologist Heitmeyer and came to denote an ethnically homogeneous segment of the population which 
isolates itself spatially, socially and culturally from mainstream society (Belwe, 2006). It has generated 
a great amount of discussion and is viewed by some, as this TV report so clearly shows, as a 
fundamental problem for a functioning democracy. 
Less than five minutes into the report, the connection which Becker spoke about, the one between 
“elsewhere,” which is Jordan, where the ethnographic data used for this paper was collected, and the 
“events and organizations at home," namely the relationship between the German state and society and 
some of its Muslim immigrants, suddenly emerged. As a matter of fact, it happened when the TV 
report showed interview snippets with young German citizens of Turkish and Albanian ethnic 
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background in which they expressed a deprecating view of certain German laws, specifically regarding 
gender equality and women’s rights. One could tell from the reactions and interjections of the German 
journalist conducting the interview, that she perceived those views as a contempt of the German 
constitution and as a quasi-attack on the fundamentals of German society. These young Turks and 
Albanians with German passports exemplified in the TV report the troublesome reality of parallel 
societies which allegedly undermine the societal consensus which the German democracy is built upon.  
On one hand, having grown up in Germany myself, I can relate to the reasoning behind the German 
journalist's interpretation and her strong feelings. On the other hand, having spent many hours listening 
to Jordanians and how they speak about their norms, society and state, I remember how the following 
shot through my mind as I listened to the young men from Turkey and Albania: “They talk just like my 
Jordanian interviewees do about their own government. They are not against us, they are just good 
Ottomans.”  
To call them “Ottomans” does have some historical legitimacy. Jordanians, Albanians and Turks were 
all part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries and thus it is not too far-fetched to suspect that one could 
find some residue of the Ottomans’ influence in their habitus. However, it would go far beyond the 
scope of this short paper to establish a defendable justification to call this relationship indexical in the 
Peircean sense. An index was for him a sign which is connected to its object by a spatio-temporal 
relationship of contiguity or of causality (Nöth, 2000, p. 66). The goal here is not to establish a shared 
historical origin of similar attitudes. For the purpose of this paper it is enough to work out their iconic 
resemblance in order to show that the reading of the situation presented in the TV report is not as 
compelling and as conclusive as it might appear. The report gives the impression that immigrants can 
be either with us or against us. Tertium non datur, a third option, is not given.  
In a similarly false dichotomy, we are told by others that we are experiencing a “clash of civilizations” 
(Huntington, 1996) and that this clash is indeed “inevitable” (Hizb al-Tahrir, 2002). Note, that both 
Western and Islamic voices suggest this narrative. While the jihadists speak of a “holy war”, George 
W. Bush declared a “war on terrorism” (“Text of George Bush’s speech,” 2001). In such times it is 
easy to be caught in the middle. Allegiances are questioned and even minor things can give rise to 
suspicions. Simply speaking a certain language can get you kicked off the airplane, of course, only if 
you have the “matching” skin and hair color (e.g. Hassan & Shoichet, 2016). 
Augsburger, in his book Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and Pattern (1992), has some 
very helpful words which help explain what the intention of this paper is: 
Conflict is a crisis that forces us to recognize explicitly that we live with multiple realities and 
must negotiate a common reality; that we bring to each situation differing - frequently 
contrasting - stories and must create together a single shared story with a role for each and 
both. (1992, p. 11) 
If our goal is to force a certain reality on whoever lives within our countries’ borders, then empathy and 
mutual understanding become meaningless. However, this paper is written with the conviction that we 
must create a shared single story or else be doomed to repeat some darker chapters in our human 
history. To create together a shared story requires imagination and sometimes, just like in personal 
conflicts, we are so stuck with our interpretation of a situation that it is virtually impossible for us to 
imagine an alternative perspective. This paper is trying to inspire the imagination of a European 
discourse by providing an example from “elsewhere”, hoping it will “enlarge” our “understanding of 
events and organization at home” by doing the following four things.  
Firstly, it will have a closer look at the interview snippets presented by the TV report in order to 
understand what exactly was seen as controversial by the journalist and then briefly point out using 
some main features of the recent Western European history of norms to show the reason behind the 
strong emotions. Secondly, the focus will then turn to the Ottoman Empire to give an overview of its 
multinormative heritage. In the hird part will be shown how the local societal circumstances and the 
political conditions of the 20th century contributed to the fact that until today Jordan not only has kept a 
system of polycentric multinormativity but even keeps implementing some laws from the Ottoman 
period. In a fourth step, insights from the ethnographic interviews conducted in Jordan will be 
presented to substantiate and illustrate the polycentric multinormativity we have been speaking about. 
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Undermining the constitution or defending basic rights? 
A school class, presumably 9th grade, discussed a film about the honor killing of a young woman. 
Although almost all of the students in that particular class were born and raised in Germany and also 
held German citizenship, some of them seemed to empathize more with the perpetrator than with the 
victim. This triggered the journalist Rita Knobel-Ulrich's curiosity and she decided to visit the class and 
conduct some interviews (Knobel-Ulrich, 2015). 
The interviews, which were obviously edited and shortened, were recorded in a classroom with other 
students present. The class consisted of male and female students and was also ethnically mixed, 
composed of students with and without a migratory background. The report showed only snippets with 
multiple cuts from an interview conducted by Rita Knobel-Ulrich (RKU). Starting at 3:07 min until 
4:49 min, the TV report shows three young men who probably are around 15 or 16 years old. Baran 
Cantirt (BC) with Turkish background, Arton Muslin (AM) with Albanian background and Ali 
Kayamaz (AK) whose ethnic background was not explicitly mentioned but according to his name 
probably also is of Turkish decent. What follows is a transcript which I translated from German.  
Translated Transcript 
1. BC: I have a sister, she is 16 and I, I myself go ballistic if she goes out with a guy or so. 
2. RKU: We are living in Germany. Here girls are allowed to dance, to go out and to decide for 
themselves with whom they want to be friends. 
3. BC (chuckling): No. She's not allowed. 
4. RKU: You wouldn't allow that? 
5. BC: No. 
6. RKU: But you're German! You're born here. You've got a German passport. 
7. BC: One has to preserve the honor of one's sister. 
8. RKU: But your sister has the same rights like you. After all we do have a constitution. Good 
grief! 
9. BC: Yes, sure, but I don't accept it. 
10. Speaker: The classmates listen interestedly. Now others raise their hands. 
11. AM: I'm also born here, yeah. 
12. RKU: You're German. 
13. AM: Yeah, that's right. 
14. RKU: And would you marry a German woman? A Christian, for example? Lena, Laura, Lisa? 
15. AM: Well, marrying? Dating, maybe yes, but not marrying. With us it is that we have to 
marry a compatriot, an Albanian. I'm Albanian. She needs to be Albanian. And a Muslima. 
Yeah. 
16. RKU: Does she have to obey you? 
17. AM: Yes, of course. It's like Baran already said... if she hangs out with guys or even sleeps 
with them then one maybe even has to use violence. 
18. RKU: In the constitution it says: men and women have equal rights. 
19. AM: OK, but... 
20. RKU interrupts him: That you don't accept. 
21. AM: No, I don't accept it. 
22. RKU: But it's our constitution. 
23. AM going silent, looking down at the desk and muttering: Well... (silence for some seconds) 
24. RKU: So the family is more important than the constitution 
25. AM: Yeah, actually it is. 
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26. Camera moves to AK sitting next to him. AK: It's the father who usually sets down the law at 
home and we have to obey him. 
Observations 
Before presenting several observations, it seems appropriate to point out that these interview snippets 
do not necessarily represent the actual modus operandi of these young men in their real lives. We are 
dealing here not with how these interviewees actually behave, but how they describe they would 
behave. To use Cicourel’s insight, we are dealing with “accounts” of specific situations which can be 
seen as “representational devices for communicating their experiences and their claims to knowledge” 
(Cicourel, 1974, p. 9). In addition to this qualification, it is important to recognize the edited nature of 
their statements. This transcript tells us not so much about the real social reality but about how these 
young men talk about their reality and how Knobel-Ulrich uses their statements in presenting them 
according to her own perception.  
Keeping this in mind, there are some observations worth mentioning. The first one is about how being 
German is defined. Knobel-Ulrich defines that being born in Germany (paras. 6 & 12) and carrying a 
German passport (para. 6) means to be German. Furthermore, it also entails unwavering loyalty to the 
German constitution, including full support of gender equality as is defined in the Grundgesetz, i.e. the 
constitution, which is to be seen as the highest normative authority (paras. 6, 8, 18 & 22). 
Her “German” interlocutors with migratory backgrounds certainly did not seem to agree with her 
entirely. None of them uses “German” when referring to themselves. After Arton Muslin concedes that 
he is born in Germany (there is obviously a question which preceded his utterance which is not part of 
the report but was cut off while editing the interview), Knobel-Ulrich deduces that he is German, which 
he then acknowledges by a “yeah, that's right” (paras. 11 - 13). However, he does identify himself 
readily as Albanian and refers to his Albanian identity three times in his next response (para. 15).  
Another difference between the journalist and the interviewees is the fact that she keeps referencing the 
German law and constitution, while the young men do not seem to refer to any state or government 
whatsoever, neither to German nor to the Turkish or the Albanian state, constitution or laws. Rather, 
they invoke other kinds of normative authorities, namely customs (paras. 3, 7 & 15), religion (para. 15) 
and authoritative figures from the family (paras. 1, 9, 17 & 26). 
For Knobel-Ulrich the questions regarding equal rights of men and women seem to be indexical in the 
sense of Michael Silverstein's concept of indexical orders which describes “how semiotic agents access 
macro-sociological plane categories and concepts as values in the indexable realm of the micro-
contextual” (Silverstein, 2003, p. 193). Concrete actions, features or artifacts become linked to ideas or 
values on a higher level of abstraction. The previously mentioned phenomenon of people being 
deplaned for speaking Arabic can be explained with such indexical orders. Due to such indexical 
orders, the parents or grandparents of some US-American friends with German origin stopped speaking 
German during WWII because speaking German became a sign of ambiguous loyalties. 
Therefore, openly denying equal rights to females, as Baran Cantirt does (paras. 1 & 3), does not just 
mean to disagree with a specific part of the German legal system but it points to and indexes a certain 
kind of attitude which is irreconcilable with living in Germany (para. 2) and incompatible with being a 
German (para. 6). It does not seem important in this context to inquire if members of these alleged 
parallel societies otherwise live a law-abiding life, e.g. if they obey the traffic rules, send their children 
to school, comply with all the regulations in their businesses and pay their taxes. 
Some indexical orders bestow prestige on their users and are used to mark a certain societal standing or 
the claim to it. Silverstein calls this “identity-by-visible-consumption” (Silverstein, 2003). When 
somebody talks about a wine like an expert, a connoisseur, then according to Silverstein this 
oinoglossia, wine talk, might be more than just talking about wine but also about dropping some cues 
for others on a micro-sociological plane to link herself to a certain macro-sociological elite identity. 
Obviously, this can be done by many things, e.g. other kind of talk, like semiotics talk, certain clothes 
or artefacts, taking part in certain events like tasting, etc., but it is important that there exists an 
indexical order, shared by the other sign users, in which the index can unfold its appeal. Obviously, 
such prestige conferring indexicals are not equally accessible throughout the population. There are also 
those indexicals which have bad connotations and are not desirable, at least in certain circles, and 
therefore are avoided, like a certain accent which makes me sound uneducated or listening to certain 
musical styles. 
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Silverstein also maps out how these orders come into being and how lower-order indexicality develops 
into higher-order indexicality. In other words, how certain phenomena which were there without people 
being aware of them, first start being noticed and then acquire certain meanings and eventually develop 
into rather stable associations between concrete and visible, i.e. micro-sociological, phenomena and 
concepts, categories or values on a macro-sociological plane. 
Knobel-Ulrich’s TV report, I argue, does in fact, knowingly or not, work towards developing such a 
negative indexical order using attitudes espoused by certain Muslim immigrants in regard to women 
and gender equality as the micro-sociological representamen indexing a macro-sociological interpretant 
by which she effectively is driving this group into a corner to coerce them into assimilation.  
Since this is ethically questionable and sociologically counterproductive, this paper attempts a 
deconstruction of the TV report’s reading.  In the next section, I will try to answer on what logical basis 
her arguments work. 
The supremacy of the state in the normative hierarchy in Germany 
The persuasiveness of Knobel-Ulrich’s argument is connected to the history of norms in societies like 
France, Germany or the Netherlands where the state with its legal norms came to assume a dominant 
and unique position in the hierarchy of normative systems, at least on the national scale, one might add. 
Bourdieu views the state as “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of 
capital” which even creates some sort of “metacapital granting power over other species of capital and 
over their holders” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 41). 
According to Weber, Germany and other European societies went through a process of secularization 
and Entzauberung, i.e. disenchantment. Aron points out that “[i]n a material and disenchanted world, 
religion can only withdraw into the privacy of the conscience or vanish toward the beyond of a 
transcendent God or of an individual destiny after earthly existence” (Aron, 1967, p. 224). Thus, it is 
not surprising that some European states, including Germany, experienced what has come to be known 
as Kulturkampf, culture struggle, in the second half of the 19th century during which questions about 
the role and authority of religion in the modern state, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, were 
settled in favor of the power of the secular state (Kent, 1978).  
These processes contributed to the concentration of capital of the state leading to the point that the state 
became something “which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and 
symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population” 
(Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40, emphasis in original) and thus created a nested hierarchy of norms. Like 
Russian matryoshka dolls, where one doll is encompassed by the next bigger in size and the biggest 
contains them all, the state contains and claims precedence over all other normative codes. Other 
examples of a nested hierarchy would be biological taxonomies or the military command structure, 
where the commands from a higher level always trump the lower level commands and the military in 
its entirety has to submit to one commander-in-chief. 
In such a neatly and stringently organized, or at least imagined, hierarchy, Knobel-Ulrich's argument 
decrying the categorical refusal of certain German laws is understandable. Nevertheless, even in such a 
stringently organized hierarchy there is normative pluralism and polycentricity. In fact, the very 
existence of different normative systems and centers of authority require the paradigm of nested 
hierarchies to be assigned unambiguous positions within such a hierarchical structure. However as we 
shall see in the next section, there are other ways to regulate the different competing competencies and 
jurisdictions. They are different not only in terms of who is on top but the whole structure looks less 
like a triangle but shows more peaks, is more polymorphic with changing jurisdictions depending on 
different factors. Generally, in such an overlapping hierarchy, relationships are more ambiguous.  
Polycentric Multinormativity as Alternative Model 
The Ottoman Inheritance 
Unlike the development in France, Germany and other European states which lead to a unique position 
of the state endowing the state with a normative authority which supersedes other normative authorities 
and codes, be it religious, tribal or any other societal code, the intercodal relations in the Ottoman 
Empire took a very different shape.  
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The Empire's beginnings lay in the end of the 13th century and at one point it controlled much of 
Southeastern Europe, Western Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. Needless to 
say this entailed a plethora of different languages, cultures, religions and ethnic groups who all needed 
to be governed and to integrated to a certain degree, at least administratively, into the Empire (Kia, 
2008). 
In 1516-17 the area, which is now roughly the western and most populated part of Jordan, was 
conquered by the Ottomans and remained in the Empire for 400 years (Irvine, Abu Jaber, & As’hab, 
2016; Shaw & Yapp, 2016). However, the Ottomans never seem to have found it worth their effort to 
get a tight grip on this area. The population living on the territory before the foundation of the Emirate 
of Transjordan in 1921 is usually “described as highly ‘divided,’ ‘lawless,’ having no ‘central' 
authority’” and, as Massad points out, even the British concluded that “[d]ue to the inability and 
disinterest of the Ottoman state to administer (what became) Transjordan effectively, the 'population' 
(…) was unaccustomed to obedience to central authority” (Massad, 2001, p. 26). 
However, even apart from the challenges which this particular region posed to a centralized 
government, the Ottoman Empire generally was not really interested in a strong centralization of its 
dominion until rather late in its history. Originally it was “built on the principle of dividing the 
population of the empire into separate and distinct religious communities” (Kia, 2008, p. 105) which 
eventually led to the millet system. The millet system enabled the Ottomans on one hand to allow their 
subjects to carry on their lives according to their own religious, cultural, and ethnic traditions and on 
the other hand to incorporate them into the Ottoman system on the administrative, economic and 
political level (Karpat, 1982, p. 142).  
While the debate regarding specific questions about the origin and dissemination of the millet system is 
ongoing (see Braude, 1982 for a critical review), what modern scholarship has been able to establish is 
that understanding the idea of the millet system, as such, is essential for understanding the process of 
nation formation in the area “not only in order to understand the dichotomy between nation and state, 
but also in order to evaluate, in depth, the socio-cultural characteristics of the national states in the 
Balkans and the Middle East born out of the millet matrix” (Karpat, 1982, p. 141). 
For our purposes it is particularly noteworthy that the millets became “intermediate bodies between the 
individual and the State” which “were recognized as having jurisdiction over their own community not 
only in religious affairs, but also in civil and penal matters” and even “were responsible for the 
collection of taxes” (Pacini, 1998, p. 5). Even those Christian communities who were not recognized as 
millets (at least before the 19th  century) – viz. the Maronites, Nestorians and Syrian Orthodox – “for 
all practical purposes (...) functioned as autonomous religious communities under their own leaders” 
(Kia, 2008, p. 3).  
Thus, for the longest part of its history, the Ottoman Empire did not enforce a centralized and unified 
legal system but generally preferred that all of their subjects, and not just some minorities, would rule 
themselves in domains which were not relevant to running the Empire.  
In the second half of the 18th and through the 19th century the pressure from the rising European powers 
grew for the Ottomans to modernize and centralize their system in order to become more competitive, 
particularly in the military domain. This phase of continuous reformations is known as the Tanzimat 
and one important outcome was the creation of the Mejalla, which was “a comprehensive compendium 
of Hanafi fiqh to be administered in the new civil (Nizamiye) courts” (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 74). It was 
the first legal system in Ottoman history which was applicable to all subjects, no matter what ethnic or 
religious background (Onar, 1955). 
However even in this unifying legal codex, and this is of crucial importance, did the did the Ottomans 
not embark on regulating the entirety of life of their subjects but only that “which was essential to 
modernizing the Ottoman Empire versus that which maintained its 'traditional' cultural identity” 
(Massad, 2001, p. 51). The regulation of family law and inheritance law remained with the religious 
courts. Nota bene, in a society where religion and family are pivotal values and constitute the core of 
identity, these domains and the norms regulating them are anything but peripheral or secondary. As 
central as these matters were for the different groups and the individuals, the Empire did not see this 
self-ruling space as something that was threatening the state's interest. 
The Majalla had great influence on the Middle East far beyond the existence of the Ottoman Empire. 
After all, it  
served as the civil code in a number of successor states (e.g., in Iraq until 1951, and in Jordan 
until 1952), and as a major source for the composition of a civil code in others (e.g., by the 
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renowned jurist ‛Abd al-Razzq Amad al-Sanhr in Egypt in 1949, in Syria in 1949, and in Iraq 
in 1951, as well as in Israel, where several of its statutes are still in effect). It has even inspired 
the civil codes of several nonsuccessor states, such as Afghanistan and Malaysia. (Hanioğlu, 
2008, p. 74) 
In summary it can be said that the Ottoman Empire basically operated in a polycentric and 
multinormative mode where the state accepted that other normative authorities regiment core domains 
of the everyday life of their subjects. The state did not expect that all of its subjects should live under 
the same law, at least in some domains, and it did not view its role as interfering in those domains. This 
basic attitude was handed down to some of its successor states, including Transjordan. 
In Jordan's legal system 
When the Ottoman Empire was disassembled, Transjordan was given to Abdullah I, who inherited the 
difficult task to do the opposite of what was happening in so many other places of the former Ottoman 
Empire. Greece and Serbia, for example, were created on the basis of a Serbian and Greek nation 
which started to claim the right to its own independent statehood. The construct of Transjordan, out of 
which the modern state of Jordan would eventually evolve, was a complete novelty; an entity with 
these borders had never existed before. In other words, there was no such thing as a Transjordanian (or 
Jordanian) nation to start with, but rather a group of tribes inhabiting the territory which became 
Transjordan (Fathi, 1994).  
Whereas usually “the autonomy and relative power of tribes is inversely related to the strength and 
authority of a centralized, bureaucratic state,” the Jordanian case constitutes an interesting exception 
for the simple reason that “at its inception the state built its base on the allegiance of the tribes” (Fathi, 
1994, p. 49). Obviously, this gave the tribes, including their norms, a strong position.  
In Turkey, Atatürk decided to pursue a rather strong secularist route what would later become known 
as Kemalism. In Transjordan, such a course of action probably would have been neither feasible 
because the population had not been exposed to the same ideas as Turkey over the 18th and the early 
19th century. Nor was it the Hashemites' dream to rule a secular state. Quite the opposite in fact, they 
were aspiring to reestablish the caliphate (Paris, 2003).  
Thus while Turkey itself abandoned the Majallah as early as 1926, from the point of view of the 
Hashemites, the Ottoman legal system fit their immediate needs rather well. Consequently the Majallah 
remained in effect until 1952. As a matter of fact, in some parts it is still effective today (Hayajneh, 
2012) and until this day the religious courts “have jurisdiction over all matters of 'personal status'” 
which includes “most family law matters such as marriage, divorce, child custody, and adoption or 
guardianship,” including “all inheritance matters” (U.S. Embassy in Jordan, n.d.).  
From these short remarks it is already abundantly clear that in Transjordan the state acknowledged two 
other normative forces - tribes and religion - which were older and more primordial than itself. Also, 
the role of influence of religion seems to be rather well-established. The state's constitution stipulates 
that Islam is the religion of the State (“Constitution,” n.d., article 2) and it delegates important areas of 
its citizens to the religious courts (article 104). In a sense even legitimacy of the Hashemites to rule the 
country is, at least partly, based on the “Hashemites’ ancestral ties to the Prophet Muhammed,” which 
presupposes an Islamic framework to be seen as valid (Brinch, 2015, p. 2).  
What about the role and influence of tribal authority and norms, though? It is true that the law of tribal 
courts from 1936 was officially abolished in 1976. Nevertheless, tribal norms, tribal reconciliation and 
dispute resolution are still a vital part of the Jordanian culture and customs (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008). 
The tribal norms strongly emphasize concepts such as hospitality, generosity, group loyalty and 
protection of family honor (Antoun, 2000). The avoidance of shame and its removal are very central 
and strongly connected to questions of female chastity and the reputation of sexual purity of the female 
members of the tribe and family. Violations of tribal norms which result in loss of face and shame often 
require either revenge or so-called honor-killings (Augsburger, 1992). 
There are several laws which still refer to tribal code, but there are two things particularly which have 
been functioning as loopholes through which the tribal norms and procedures still can function. Firstly, 
as Furr and Al-Serhan explain, when it comes to criminal matters, the Jordanian legal system 
recognizes a public and a personal right. These rights acknowledge the interconnection of the state and 
tribal law. If a person is convicted in the state system the public right is satisfied. If the victim's family 
agrees, usually through the tribally recognized procedures and the payment of “blood money” to 
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relinquish its private right, the court can reduce the sentence to the minimum required by the state. The 
courts can reduce capital cases to imprisonment under this system. (Furr & Al-Serhan, 2008, p. 23). 
Secondly, article 98 of the penal code “excuses what can be termed 'crime of passion' because the 
person committing it is not acting rationally” (Sonbol, 2003, p. 323). It is important to understand that 
although the law is an import from French criminal codes, it does not share the French definition of a 
crime of passion. In France a person who e.g. discovers that his wife is cheating on him, catching her 
with her lover in flagrante delicto, and kills her out of rage, might go free. If he left the room to look 
for a weapon then the “crime under passion” plea would be refused by the judge. In Jordan, however, 
“a person could go a month before killing his victim and still be considered ‘out of his mind’” (Sonbol, 
2003, p. 324). Similarly, article 340 gives a “reduced sentence to just about any member of a clan who 
kills or harms a female relative for what he considers to be sexual misconduct” (Sonbol, 2003, p. 321). 
Although there are more instances of the Jordanian law accommodating tribal norms and customs, 
these examples shall suffice to show that in Jordan people live in a real polycentric multinormativity 
without the state law superseding all other codes in the form of a nested hierarchy. In fact in early 
2016, Daoud Kuttab (2016) described the handling of a murder case in the Jordan Times which 
illustrates the overlapping hierarchy of norms. It is a case where tribal law blatantly replaced civil law 
through an atwa, a tribal agreement: 
The agreement, signed by Minister Mohammad Thneibat, declares without trial the guilt of the 
suspected killer, decides capital punishment for him and vows not to pursue any effort for 
clemency for him. 
Furthermore, the tribal agreement includes a decision to deport all the relatives of the 
suspected killer, including decedents “up to his fifth grandfather”. The jalweh, or deportation, 
applies to tens of Jordanian families that must leave their homes and towns for three months. 
In return for this harsh and unconstitutional punishment, the families of the killed agree not to 
take revenge against the other tribe. (Kuttab, 2016) 
By putting his signature under an agreement which spells complete disregard of civil law and human 
rights (United Nations, n.d., e.g. articles 3, 10 & 13), the state, as represented by the minister, bowed to 
the tribal authorities and their customary laws. It also shows that, firstly, tribal law and civil law are not 
always compatible or smoothly complementing each other but often stand in direct contradiction to 
each other and, secondly, that it is not clear which one comes out on top. 
In Jordan's everyday life 
We have traced the roots of Jordan’s polycentric multinormativity through historical and legal 
literature. It is time now to gain a direct impression from the everyday life of Jordanians today. So how 
is the situation presently in the Jordanian society regarding tribal and religious norms in relation to 
governmental norms and laws? 
Research 
For the purpose of my inquiry I use a sociolinguistic approach and focus on the three words, ʿayb 
 At the beginning of my time in Jordan, as I started studying .(ممنوع) and mamnūʿ ,(حرام) ḥarām ,(عيب)
Arabic, I remember mixing these words up because for me they all denoted something “forbidden”. As 
a matter of fact, all three words can be categorized as metapragmatic qualifiers denoting violations of 
injunctive norms. Injunctive norms are norms which people are expected to comply with as opposed to 
merely descriptive norms (Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004). Gradually, I came to 
understand why my interlocutors looked so puzzled when I called something ḥarām even though it had 
nothing to do with religion. These words - particularly ʿayb and ḥarām - are neither synonyms nor are 
they related in degree, for example hot and warm, and Jordanians have a rather keen sense of their 
distinct meanings and use them meticulously for certain domains and the respective norms. I learned 
that 
1. ʿayb is used to categorize something as shame or shameful 
2. ḥarām pertains to things forbidden by religion 
3. mamnūʿ is derived from manaʿ (to forbid) and literally means “forbidden”  
The data used for this paper were collected during the first out of two rounds of interviews for a 
dissertation project which was motivated by the question how norms function, develop and change in 
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the Jordanian society and started off with the hypothesis that each of the three metapragmatic qualifiers 
stand in a substantially well-defined relation to one of the three different normative codes mentioned 
earlier, viz. mamnūʿ being mapped onto the legal code, ḥarām on the religious code, and ʿayb invoking 
the tribal or social codes, which I will henceforth call customary code.  
From March 25 until June 23, 2015, altogether 31 Jordanian citizens were interviewed, 14 men and 17 
women ranging from age 16 to 74, out of whom 4 were of Christian and the remainder of Muslim 
background. Roughly half, viz. 16, live in Amman. Two live in a small village close to Ajloun, two in 
the rural area North of Irbid, five in a small town in the Northern Jordan valley, four in a town in Ghor 
Safi, one from Aqaba and one from Kerak. The level of education of the interviewees varied between 
PHD (linguistics and economics) and elementary school education.  
The interviews were conducted in spoken local Arabic as semi-structured ethnographic interviews in 
the private homes of the interviewees, the homes of their friends or relatives or their workplaces. The 
bulk of interviews is ranged in length from 20 minutes to one hour.  
Except in four cases, all the other interviewees were asked in the first part of the interview to talk about 
their personal background and their upbringing and then to describe a normal day in their everyday life. 
The second part of the interview focused on the three words ʿayb, ḥarām and mamnūʿ, inquiring what 
the difference between them is and how they relate to each other, if there are gender-related 
differences, and how the interviewees felt about those differences.   
Findings from the research data 
Hypothesis confirmed regarding ʿayb and ḥarām 
The collected data partly confirmed the hypothesized correlations between the three words and the 
different sets of norms. ʿayb was clearly linked to customary norms and ḥarām invoked exclusively 
religious norms. The only exception regarding ḥarām was the exclamation “ya ḥarām!” which is an 
expression of sympathy and pity and could be translated as “Poor thing!” or “Have some mercy!” 
Apart from this exception, interviewees consistently claimed that both terms were unequivocally 
related to customary traditions or religion, respectively. Although ḥarām is seen as Islamic in origin, 
the interviewees agreed that it was also widely used by Christians. 
Ḥarām more “real” than ʿayb 
Compared to ʿayb, ḥarām was seen as being more “real”. This came back to me recently when I 
listened to a Jordanian friend reasoning about the ubiquitous nuisance of cutting-in-line and telling me 
that he realized that it was ḥarām. Humans discover if things are ḥarām or not, they do not decide if 
they should be or not because God is the authority and He decided what is ḥarām and ḥalāl (the 
opposite of ḥarām, i.e. allowed). ʿayb, on the other hand, is built on what people think, on customs and 
traditions. These can vary from family to family, from place to place and over time. 
Mamnūʿ with more complex pattern of codal relations 
The word mamnūʿ showed a much more complex pattern of dissemination over the three different 
codes with a conspicuous difference between Amman and the rest of the country. As mentioned 
previously, it means literally “forbidden” and as such it can be used to talk about something forbidden 
by any of the three different normative codes. Interviewees sometimes said something was mamnūʿ 
because it was ʿayb or ḥarām. However, when interviewees were asked if there is a difference between 
mamnūʿ and the other two words it became clear that many things which are neither ḥarām nor ʿayb 
could nevertheless be mamnūʿ, indicating that there are normative authorities besides the religion and 
the customs.  
Mamnūʿ invokes the idea of an authority which has the power to declare rules. This could be either 
private rules of a family, e.g. set down by the father or other authoritative figures, or the “rules” of the 
government, viz. the state laws. Crossing a red light or violating some building regulation would be 
seen as mamnūʿ but has nothing to do with ʿayb or ḥarām.  
However, mamnūʿ is not simply an umbrella term comprising all normative codes. Although, it can be 
used to refer to violations of the religious and the customary code, it is also used frequently in an 
exclusively legal sense – in opposition to ʿayb and ḥarām. Certain things, like e.g. smoking in front of 
one's father, are not mamnūʿ, i.e. it is not forbidden by law, but they are nevertheless ʿayb. Thus, 
mamnūʿ can be used as a general term referring to any violation of injunctive norms no matter which 
kind or as referring to a specific normative code, usually the legal code or family rules, as opposed to 
the other codes. 
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Mamnūʿ in Amman and mamnūʿ outside Amman are not the same 
Often interviewees were asked what the basis or the authority for the different words were. ʿayb and 
ḥarām were always easy to answer, as already mentioned. In Amman, mamnūʿ frequently was 
associated with the “law” (kānūn). Interestingly, this relation cannot be established from the data 
gathered outside Amman even though some of the interviewees had worked for the government, either 
as teachers or as military personnel. The state with its laws seems to be virtually non-existent in the 
thinking of people living outside Amman because, except for one Christian man around Kerak, nobody 
used kānūn to explain the word mamnūʿ. 
Central role of ʿayb and customary code 
One important question of the research – one which is also very central for our present discussion – is 
about the relation between the different normative codes and implicitly the normative authorities and 
sources behind them. In this regard, it was most interesting to watch some of the reactions when people 
were asked the question “Is there a difference between ʿayb, ḥarām and mamnūʿ? And if so, what is 
it?” 
One of the interviewees, M023, was a Christian man in his late 50s, born and raised in a village close to 
Kerak, who has been living and working in Amman for decades. As he hears the question about ʿayb, 
ḥarām and mamnūʿ his face breaks into a transfigured smile like somebody who was shown a picture 
from his childhood and says: “ʿayb, ḥarām, mamnūʿ. [Short pause.] When I hear these words I 
remember that I'm a Jordanian,” and continues to explain how children in Jordan are raised on the 
concept of ʿayb. Later during the interview, when asked which of the three concepts he believes to be 
the strongest (‘aqwa) in the society, he responds without any hesitation and full conviction by 
exclaiming: “ʿayb!” He then goes on to give single-handedly what could be considered the summary of 
all the data in a nutshell regarding this question: 
The mamnūʿ, that is maybe something from daddy or mommy or there is mamnūʿ in 
the laws. But the ʿayb that is something in the society. Never mind if you do wrong 
things at home, maybe you get punished; they beat you. But if you do something 
ʿayb, that brings the ʿayb to the whole family, to all the families. Dishonor! And it 
brings the dishonor to the whole family and that's the disaster because where should 
we turn our face from the [scornful] looks? And what's the appearance in front of the 
people because the important thing is what people say about us. It's the most 
important! So, the ʿayb is the biggest. If you are very religious, then the ḥarām is 
stronger. But in the society the ʿayb is the strongest because the ʿayb pertains to the 
whole society and therefore it disfigures the face of a person or of the family in front 
of all the people. The mamnūʿ, since it is different from house to house, there is no 
disgrace in the mamnūʿ, there is punishment. The ḥarām is an offence against God 
and if you are religious that is also a disaster. (M023, para. 15) 
He is not the only one who smiled when he heard the question. A Muslim man in his early 30s from 
Mafraq who also has been living in Amman for several years, smiled when I asked him the question. 
“Why do you smile?” I ask. “I'm smiling,” he responds, “because these three words, they use them a lot 
in our culture.” And shortly later stresses particularly the frequent usage of ʿayb: “The word ʿayb, in 
each house we hear it tens of times, ʿayb, ʿayb…” (M011, para. 84 & 86).  
ʿayb – feared but not loved 
The dominance of ʿayb and the customary code was not seen necessarily as something positive or 
desirable by many, if not most of the interviewees. While the religious code underlying ḥarām was 
generally seen as just and good, even by secular people who obviously did not comply with 
conservative norms. Only very few people, mostly such who had converted to Christianity, dared to 
criticize Islam. However, the majority of people were ready to admit that they were less than fully 
supportive of the customary code. In fact, for some it was something which should be done away with 
and replaced either by religion or secular laws and norms. 
Women disadvantaged in the customary code and ʿayb  
The greatest problem people had with ʿayb and the customary code had to do with the fact that it places 
vastly different restrictions on males and females. It focuses on the value of family and tribal honor and 
the avoidance of shame. As the family honor is directly tied to the chastity and reputation of the female 
members, everything becomes ʿayb that could endanger the reputation of the girl, and consequently the 
honor of the family. More often than not the question about what is ʿayb lead the conversation directly 
to gender related issues and sexual norms for women. This was not just connected to Jordanian-
Bedouin tribal culture, as the definition of ʿayb by a middle-aged Palestinian city dweller with a PHD 
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in educational linguistics clearly shows: “If we are talking about ʿayb, then mostly this is connected to 
moral issues with an immediate connection to sexual relations” (M013, para. 46). 
Obviously, there are also norms which apply to men but a Muslim couple in their late 40s (F001 & 
M002), taught me two sayings early on in the process which resonated deeply with anybody I happened 
to quote them to: “The man is not shamed by shame” (al-zalama ma bi3ibu il-3ayb) and “A women is 
like glass” (al-mara zay il-qazaz), meaning that a man can basically do whatever he wants and he will 
still be able to remedy his honor, but for women the damage is permanent – like a broken glass 
(M002.1b). The consequences could be tragic as the continuous occurrence of honor killings in Jordan 
clearly indicates. Although, it is only a few families who take such measures to remedy their honor, 
usually the girl and also her siblings will have a permanently damaged reputation which is very 
disadvantageous when looking for a marital partner. 
Needless to say, it is particularly women who are dissatisfied with the ʿayb code. Interestingly, though, 
many of them do not turn to secularism or an Islamic form of feminism but insist that the dominance of 
ʿayb is a sign of jahiliyya, i.e. the state of ignorance before the divine revelation arrived, and that 
introducing and enforcing the sharia – particularly through educating women about Islam, would 
remedy the problem. 
Concluding remarks on polycentric multinormativity in everyday life of Jordan 
As the insights from the interviews have so clearly shown, Jordanians live their lives in the rich 
tapestry of the overlapping hierarchy of norms with multiple normative codes and also multiple 
authoritative centers defining those codes. Some of these norms, particularly customary norms and to a 
certain degree religious norms, are more central to their lives and their identity than e.g. legal norms. 
The customary norms happen to focus a lot on gender relations and family roles and the state does not 
have an important role in this domain. 
Conclusion 
This short survey dealt mainly with institutionalized forms of Jordan’s multinormativity and showed 
that, unlike the German case it is spread out over different kinds of institutional centers, including those 
which do not even pertain to the realm of the state. In fact although the Europeans spread the 
Westphalian system during colonial times and with it its distinctly European concept of state, the 
colonized people, for the most part, never adopted the European state idea entirely but developed 
hybrid versions, integrating different elements from both backgrounds (Bacik, 2008). In Germany the 
development favored to absorb most of these institutional centers into the orbit of the state and to 
allocate them in a nested hierarchy. That gave the state the prime position to influence all other norms 
according to its own core narrative or at least to render those norms as inconsequential which were 
incompatible with its own. The historical circumstances in Jordan, together with its Ottoman past and 
the distinctly tribal texture of its society, led to the polycentric multinormativity as described in the 
previous section. What countries like Germany are facing now is the re-importing of those hybridized 
institutional cultures, which in some ways are similar to theirs, but at the same time also espouse 
distinctly different notions of public and private domains and corresponding norms.  
Baran, Arton and Ali, the three young men from the TV report, surely know something about the 
friction between different cultures as they try to negotiate coexisting and conflicting norms in specific 
chronotopic units of their everyday lives. There is no need, however, to frame these frictions as 
instances of an ideological battle over abstract values. Having read all the information from the 
previous section, one only needs to imagine for a moment what it would be like for a Jordanian family 
to live in a country like Germany. Even if all the family members tried hard to integrate, without giving 
up on their own identity altogether, and if they all adopted the German state as their new legitimate 
patron and gave it the same loyalty as they would back in Jordan, they might very well end up talking 
the same way the young men from Albania and Turkey, not because they are against us or our state, but 
just because they are good “Ottomans”.  
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